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I. Introduction
Laws exist in every state allowing for the involuntary
mental hospitalization of persons believed to suffer from mental
disorder.' These laws are grounded in the state's parens patriae
power, to care for persons who are unable to care for themselves,
and its police power, to protect the public safety and welfare.2
In most states prior to the 1960's, involuntary civil commit-
ment was largely a medical phenomenon. Anyone a physician
deemed to be in need of treatment might have been subject to
commitment; court involvement, where provided for, typically
was little more than an "administrative monitoring, often cur-
sory, of a medically oriented process upon which jural apparatus
ha[d] been grafted."'3 In the last twenty years, however, this
1. In many jurisdictions, other than New York, involuntary outpatient treatment
also is possible. See generally, Practice Manual - State Laws Governing Civil Com-
mitment, 3 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 205, 205-14 (1979).
2. See Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1207-28 (1974).
3. R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE
MENTALLY ILL 259 (1968).
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medical approach to commitment decisionmaking has given way
in most states to a more legalistic, due process approach. Point-
ing to the "massive curtailment of liberty"" that involuntary
commitment entails, lawmakers throughout the country have
tightened commitment standards and accorded prospective pa-
tients an array of procedural rights and protections.5 Some ob-
servers contend that this "legalization" of the civil commitment
process has gone too far: that in many areas of the country it has
become unreasonably difficult to ensure that even seriously dis-
ordered persons receive the treatment they need.6 Others sug-
gest that, despite these changes in the law, civil commitment
4. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
5. See Zimmerman & Fitch, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Discerning Eye of
the Law, 5 STATE CT. J. Fall 1981, at 5. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-52-1 to -10 (Supp.
1983); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-501 to -520 (Supp. 1983-1984); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 5150 (West 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-176 to -183 (West Supp. 1984);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 37-3-1, -61, -62 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 334-59 to -60 (Supp.
1983); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 66-317 to -329 (Supp. 1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91'/2, § 1-119
(Supp. 1984-1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-9.1-1, -10 (Burns Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 229.11 (West Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2908, -2909 (1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.014 to .191 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28:2, :54 (West Supp.
1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §§ 2332-A, 2333 (Supp. 1983-1984); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 59, §§ 12, 22 (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, §§ 1, 12 (West Supp. 1984-1985);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (West Supp. 1984-1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
253A.02, .04 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-21-102 to -129 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 83-1009, 1020, 1037 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 433.194, 433A.170, .200 (1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-B: 19, :20 (Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-23, -25, -26.3
(West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3 to -10 (1984); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.37-.43
(McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1983-1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.2, -58.3 (1981 & Supp.
1983); ND. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.1, -02, -09 (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 3,
54.4 (West Supp. 1983-1984); ORE. REV. STAT. § 426.175 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§
7301-7303 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 27A-10-1 (Supp. 1981);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-104 (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36 (Supp. 1983); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7101, 7504 (Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-2 (Supp. 1984); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51.01, .15, .20 (West Supp. 1983-1984); WYO. STAT. §§ 25-10-101 to -112
(1981).
6. See Chodoff, The Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally 11, 133
Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 497 (1976); Dickey, Incompetency and the Nondangerous Mentally
Ill Client, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 22 (1980). See generally, A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND
LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 62 (1976); Hoffman, Living with Your Rights Off, 5 AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. BULL. 68 (1977); Whitmer, From Hospitals to Jails: The Fate of
California's Deinstitutionalized Mentally Ill, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 65 (1980). Al-
though few recommend revoking any legal protections, many question the wisdom of
further expansion. See, e.g., Weitzel, Changing Law and Clinical Dilemmas, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 293 (1977); Nedelsky & Schotten, Civil Commitment and the Value of Lib-
erty, 46 Soc. RESEARCH 374 (1979).
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practices have changed very little over the years and persons
who threaten neither themselves nor others continue to be hos-
pitalized as before.7
In the interest of assessing the degree to which civil com-
mitment practices reflect civil commitment laws, and, moreover,
to identify ways in which civil commitment systems might func-
tion more effectively, the Institute on Mental Disability and the
Law of the National Center for State Courts embarked, in 1981,
on a multi-year study of civil commitment practices and proce-
dures throughout the country.8 New York City was one of six
cities in which empirical research was conducted.' This Article
presents the. findings of the research conducted in New York.10
7. See Peters, Teply, Wunsch & Zimmerman, Administrative Civil Commitment:
The Ins and Outs of the Nebraska System, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 266 (1975); Warren,
Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of California's Lanter-
man-Petris-Short Act, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 629 (1977); Markell & Hiday, Standards of
Dangerousness: Impact of Civil Commitment (unpublished manuscript) (available from
Dr. Virginia Hiday, Sociology Department, North Carolina State University). The ten-
sion between protecting the mentally ill of New York and preserving their rights most
recently appeared in Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983). In that case,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that New York civil
commitment procedures satisfied the due process requirements of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 971.
8. The general study methods of the Involuntary Civil Commitment Project are de-
scribed in the Appendix to this Article.
9. The results of the New York study are compiled in W. FITCH, B. McGRAW, J.
HENDRYX & T. MARVELL, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DEPART-
MENT, NEW YORK CITY (1982). For the results of the remaining studies, see W. FITCH,
INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN WINSTON-SALEM (1982); I. KEILITZ & B. McGRAW, AN
EVALUATION OF INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN MILWAUKEE COUNTY (1983); I. KEILITZ,
INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN COLUMBUS, OHIO (1982) [hereinafter cited as I. KEI-
LITZ, OHIO]; I. KEILITZ, W. FITCH & B. McGRAW, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN Los
ANGELES COUNTY (1982); J. ZIMMERMAN, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN CHICAGO
(1982) (These monographs are available at the National Center for State Courts in Wil-
liamsburg, Virginia.). See also, Keilitz, Fitch & McGraw, A Study of Involuntary Civil
Commitment in Los Angeles County, 14 Sw. UL. REV. 238 (1984); Keilitz & Roach, A
Study of Defense Counsel and the Involuntary Civil Commitment System in Columbus,
Ohio, 13 CAP. U.L. REV. 175 (1983); Van Duizend & Zimmerman, Involuntary Civil Com-
mitment Process in Chicago: Practices and Procedures, 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 225 (1984).
This research provided the basis for the development of national-scope guidelines for
civil commitment. See INSTITUTE ON MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE LAW, PROVISIONAL SUB-
STANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES FOR INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT (1982) [here-
inafter cited as PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES]. The National Task Force Guidelines for Invol-
untary Civil Commitment is currently revising Provisional Guidelines.
10. The research in New York was conducted in late 1981 and mid-1983, and the
findings reported in this Article are based on research from those years.
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It consists of a descriptive analysis of the City's civil commit-
ment system,11 with suggestions for improvement. The descrip-
tive information is drawn primarily from interviews with repre-
sentatives of the legal and mental health communities in New
York and observation of judicial hearings and other commitment
proceedings. 2 The recommendations reflect the observations
and opinions of the persons interviewed as well as those of the
research staff and their advisors. 13
II. The Prehearing Process
The manner in which commitment cases are handled prior
to hearings may have more bearing on the overall success of a
commitment system than what happens at any other stage in
the commitment process. Systems that provide for effective
screening and diversion of inappropriate cases protect both the
liberty interests of the respondent 4 and the fiscal interests of
the state.
This section considers the events that occur in the involun-
tary commitment process of New York before a judicial hearing.
Many cases are disposed of in this prehearing stage. Respon-
dents in some cases are screened from hospitalization by the
physician conducting the initial evaluation; other respondents
11. The focus of this Article is on procedures for the civil commitment of mentally
ill persons in New York. The Article is not intended to apply to the commitment of
juveniles, the mentally retarded, the developmentally disabled, or persons charged with,
convicted of, or acquitted by reason of insanity of a criminal offense.
12. Research staff interviewed judges, court clerks, attorneys, psychiatrists, psychol-
ogists, social workers, hospital administrative personnel, law enforcement officers, former
patients, families of patients, and state agency representatives. Throughout this Article
all sources are reported as generic categories of people, such as judges, attorneys, hospi-
tal staff, and the like in order to ensure the anonymity of the sources interviewed. For a
description of the study methods used in conducting this research, see Appendix.
13. During the course of the study, the research staff was counseled by a board of
advisors consisting of Paul Appelbaum, University of Pittsburgh; Paul Friedman, Ennis,
Friedman, Bersoff, and Ewing; B. James George, Jr., New York Law School; Richard P.
Lynch, American Bar Association; Floyd E. Propst, Fulton County (Georgia) Probate
Court; Loren H. Roth, University of Pittsburgh; Joseph Schneider (chairperson), Cook
County (Illinois) Circuit Court; David B. Wexler, University of Arizona; and Helen
Wright, National Association for Mental Health.
14. The terms "respondent" and "patient" are used as synonyms throughout in this
study. Technically, a "patient" is one who has been admitted for mental health treat-
ment, with or without court involvement. A "respondent" is the subject of an involun-
tary commitment proceeding.
1985]
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may be hospitalized for a brief period but are discharged before
any legal process begins. Some become voluntary patients, obvi-
ating the need for any judicial involvement.
A. Initiating Mental Health Treatment
The vast majority of involuntary admissions in New York
City are initiated as emergency admissions.1 5 The emergency ad-
missions statute provides that a person may be involuntarily
hospitalized for up to fifteen days if he or she is alleged to have
"a mental illness for which immediate observation, care, and
treatment in a hospital is appropriate and which is likely to re-
sult in serious harm to himself or others.""6
Virtually all emergency admissions in the city are initiated
by the police, who have statutory authority to take into custody
anyone who appears to meet the emergency admissions crite-
ria.17 The police department's Patrol GuideI8 outlines the proce-
dures to be followed when an officer believes a person meets
these criteria. The Patrol Guide, however, prescribes no specific
behavioral criteria to assist the officer in determining when a
15. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.41 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1984-1985). Five
additional procedures are authorized for initiating involuntary civil commitment, all but
one of which are rarely if ever used in New York City. See id. § 9.43(a) (McKinney 1978)
(court-ordered hospitalization based on verified statement that respondent is mentally ill
and disorderly or dangerous); Id. § 9.43(b) (court-ordered hospitalization of criminal de-
fendant found not guilty but apparently mentally ill and dangerous); Id. § 9.45 (McKin-
ney 1978 & Sdpp. 1984-1985) (hospitalization by director of community services of per-
son reported by specified individual to be mentally ill and dangerous); Id. § 9.37
(hospitalization by director of community services or designated physician of a person
found, generally pursuant to personal examination to be mentally ill and dangerous.); Id.
§ 9.27 (hospitalization of person alleged to be mentally ill and in need of involuntary care
and treatment based upon two-physician certification). The two-physician certification
procedure is used in New York City. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
16. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39 (McKinney 1978). For statutory definition of
"likelihood to result in serious harm," see infra note 107 and accompanying text. Hospi-
tals may take emergency admissions if they maintain the appropriate staff and facilities
and are approved by the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Hygiene. The De-
partment's Regulations, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15.9(e), lists the regional offices of the
Office of Mental Health, from which current listings of approved facilities may be ob-
tained. In the First Judicial Department, there are about 14 such facilities.
17. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.41 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1983-1984). Peace of-
ficers also are authorized to initiate emergency detention. Id.
18. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, PATROL GUIDE 106-11 (as revised Aug.
1981) [hereinafter cited as PATROL GUIDE].
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/2
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person is mentally ill and dangerous; individual police officers
are expected to make such judgments based on their own
experience.
It is the police department's policy not to become involved
in potential commitment cases unless the prospective patient
presents a threat of immediate, serious harm. The police gener-
ally will not take a person into custody solely on the basis of an
allegation; rather, they will act only if an officer personally ob-
serves the aberrant behavior.
The screening provided by the police is regarded highly by
observers in the city. Although some complain that the police
miss many deserving cases by refusing to respond to all but the
most serious incidents, the department's limited resources allow
for little more. Furthermore, given that the city's hospitals ad-
mit only about fifty percent of all prospective patients brought
in by the police, 9 relaxing the criteria for police transport may
result in no significant increase in emergency admissions.
The Patrol Guide states that the officer taking custody may
use only such physical force as is minimally required to restrain
the person or to prevent serious physical injury.2 ° Before taking
the person into custody, the officer first must contain him and
call the patrol supervisor and the Emergency Service Unit for
assistance.2' The patrol supervisor may cancel the request for as-
sistance from the Emergency Service Unit, if it is not needed,
and request the aid of other services, such as an interpreter, a
hostage negotiating team, or a clergyman.22 If available, an am-
bulance must be used to transport the person to the hospital.2 3
A patrol car, however, may be used to expedite transportation in
the face of a potentially explosive situation.2 4 The police officer
must accompany the prospective patient to the hospital; two of-
ficers are required if two or more persons are being trans-
19. These estimates were provided by hospital admissions officers.
20. PATROL GUIDE, supra note 17, at 104-10, 106-11 ("physical force is used ONLY
to the extent necessary to restrain the subject until delivered to a hospital or detention
facility") (emphasis in original).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 106-11.
24. Id.
19851
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ported.2 5 The officer or officers must remain at the hospital until
the examination begins and must inform the examining physi-
cian of the events leading to the custody-taking.2"
Many procedures set out in the Patrol Guide reportedly
were conceived as time-saving devices. They reflect a deep con-
cern about the limited resources available to the department to
handle these cases. While the size of the city's police department
has been substantially reduced in recent years2 7 because of the
city's fiscal difficulties, the volume of commitments has greatly
increased.2 8 Particularly in light of these constraints, the depart-
ment's emergency admissions procedures are to be commended.
Some measures can be taken, however, to make even better use
of the department's limited resources. For example, requiring
police officers to wait at the hospital while the prospective pa-
tient is being examined is highly inefficient. Although the exam-
ining physician should have access to whatever information the
officer can provide, the officer could present this information in
writing instead of waiting to present the information in person.
Accordingly, a procedure should be developed to permit the po-
lice officer, who is transporting someone to a hospital pursuant
to the emergency admissions procedure, to leave the person in
the custody of the hospital pending the examination. Hospital
staff should develop a standard set of questions designed to
elicit from police officers information that generally would be
helpful to the physician. The questions should be available to
the police beforehand so that responses may be 'presented at the
emergency room.
The "two-physician certification" procedure, commonly re-
ferred to as the "two P.C." commitment, is the standard proce-
dure for non-emergency hospitalization in New York City and is
routinely used by the hospital staff to extend the hospitalization
of a person initially admitted under the emergency procedure.29
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Representatives of the department report that the number of officers has been
reduced by one-third in the last five years.
28. According to police department statistics, the number of people transported to
hospitals for examination increased from 1,084 in 1976 to 7,785 in 1980, almost doubling
every year.
29. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39 (McKinney 1978).
[Vol. 5:259
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Under this procedure, anyone alleged to be mentally ill and in
need of care and treatments' may be involuntarily hospitalized
upon the application of several statutorily designated individu-
als.31 The application must be accompanied by two physician's
certificates prepared on the basis of examinations conducted not
more than ten days prior to the making of the application.32
Before each examining physician certifies a patient for in-
voluntary admission to a hospital, the statute requires the physi-
cian to "consider alternative forms of care and treatment that
might be adequate to provide for the person's needs without re-
quiring involuntary hospitalization. '33 This provision requires
only that each physician "consider" alternatives, but does not
require a physician to take any particular action regarding ac-
tual alternative placement. Several attorneys interviewed sug-
gested that this provision makes little difference in the admis-
sion decision because physicians generally fail to seriously
consider alternatives. They said that the two-physician certifica-
tion papers are used as a way of giving legal status to a clinical
situation. That is, the consideration of alternatives amounts to a
procedural and not substantive impediment to involuntary ad-
mission. These attorneys suggested that at retention hearings,
which respondents may request to challenge their certification,34
the examining physicians have become sophisticated enough to
tailor answers to questions regarding alternatives to support the
recommendation for hospitalization.
During hearings that the authors observed, the testimony of
examining physicians tended to include general statements to
the effect that no suitable alternatives existed, without mention-
ing any specific facilities or programs. The testimony focused on
the severity of the particular patient's condition and the neces-
30. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
31. N.Y.MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(b) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1983-1984). This list
includes anyone residing with the respondent, a member of the respondent's immediate
family, or the director of a hospital where the respondent resides. Id.
32. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27 (McKinney 1978). A third physician, on the hos-
pital staff, must also examine the person and certify that he or she needs involuntary
care. Id. § 9.27(e). An individual so admitted may be retained without court order for 60
days.
33. Id. § 9.27(d).
34. See id. § 9.31(a). The hospital director must apply for a court order to continue
involuntary retention beyond 60 days of admission. Id. § 9.33(a).
1985]
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sity for twenty-four hour, inpatient supervision. In rare in-
stances, examining physicians testified generically about possible
alternatives. For example, one physician testified that support
services provided to the patient in her own home would be inap-
propriate. Another testified that a patient could not be released
to his family because the family was not receptive. In all cases
observed, the court ordered the maximum six-month retention."5
B. Screening
Several stages of clinical assessment follow the initial police
screening in emergency admission cases. In at least one city hos-
pital, psychiatric nurses review the prospective patient and may
refuse to admit him to the psychiatric unit if: (1) he has a seri-
ous medical problem, in which case he is transferred to a general
hospital unit for treatment, where he remains until cleared med-
ically, or (2) he does not evidence symptoms of mental illness
sufficient to merit attention by the unit. After this initial screen-
ing, a physician examines the prospective patient to determine
his suitability for admission. Psychiatrists, often psychiatric
residents, perform these examinations in the emergency room
soon after the police present the respondent for admission.
If the respondent is found not to meet the criteria for com-
mitment,37 the hospital staff may refer him to a program of ser-
vices in the community or may simply release him. Police of-
ficers may transport a respondent denied admission back to his
community or, depending on the circumstances leading to the
custody-taking, may take him to the police station to be charged
with a crime.
Persons hospitalized under the emergency admissions pro-
cedure may not be retained in the hospital for more than forty-
eight hours unless a second examination by a physician confirms
the finding of mental illness and dangerousness. 3 8 There is some
confusion whether this examination must be performed within
forty-eight hours of the person's arrival at the hospital or within
35. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.33(b) (McKinney 1978).
36. Id. § 9.39.
37. Reportedly, 50 to 60% of police referrals survive the hospital's strict application
of criteria for emergency admission.
38. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39 (McKinney 1978).
[Vol. 5:259
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forty-eight hours of his or her formal admission by the examin-
ing physician. 9 In any event, this system of screening protects
patients against unwarranted involuntary hospitalization and
spares society the cost of providing unnecessary care and
treatment.
C. Notifying Respondents of Rights
New York law requires that upon a respondent's admission
to a hospital or his conversion from voluntary to involuntary sta-
tus, the hospital director must immediately inform him in writ-
ing of his status, his rights under the law, and the availability of
assistance from the Mental Health Information Service
(MHIS).' ° In addition, notices of patient rights must be posted
in conspicuous places throughout the hospital.
In New York City, respondents in commitment proceedings
are informed verbally of their rights at several stages in the pro-
cess. Although the police ordinarily do not inform respondents
of the their rights during the custody-taking unless a criminal
charge is placed, examining physicians advise patients of their
rights during the initial examination in the emergency room. Af-
ter admission, MHIS staff are available to meet with patients
and explain in more detail their rights under the law. MHIS
staff meet with all who specifically request their services, but be-
cause of limited resources, cannot meet with everyone admitted
involuntarily.
Although every respondent is advised of his rights at least
once in the commitment process, the information provided may
not always be understood. Many hospital personnel consider the
notification of rights to be useless if the patient is too disori-
ented, anxious, or confused to comprehend the information.
"Overwhelming" such patients with "confusing papers" and
"verbal gibberish" may merely exacerbate an already strained
situation, they contend. Indeed, if "confusing papers" and "ver-
bal gibberish" are all that is used to communicate this advice, it
should not be surprising that patients have no clear understand-
39. Many interviewees believed hospitals more quickly release patients who request
hearings.
40. N.Y. ME NTAL HYG. LAW § 9.07 (McKinney 1978). See infra notes 68-71 and ac-
companying text for discussion of availability of community assistance.
1985]
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ing of their legal rights. Given that hearings on the question of
commitment are not mandatory, but rather are held only upon
the respondent's request,"' greater effort must be made to make
patients aware of their rights. The physicians conducting the ini-
tial examination should take great care to use language the pa-
tient can understand and should question the patient concerning
his understanding of what has been said. The MHIS should con-
sider, as a matter of first priority, meeting personally with each
patient soon after his or her admission.
D. Alternatives to Involuntary Admission
Persons subject to commitment proceedings, and other
mentally ill persons in New York, may be admitted for inpatient
psychiatric treatment as informal patients, voluntary patients,
or involuntary patients. A hospital director may informally ad-
mit a person requesting treatment without requiring a formal
application. An informal patient may leave at any time.42 Volun-
tary admissions require that the prospective patient apply for
admission in writing."3 Ordinarily, voluntary patients must be
released promptly upon their request. The hospital director may
retain a voluntary patient for up to seventy-two hours, however,
if there are "reasonable grounds for belief that the patient may
be in need of involuntary care and treatment."44 At the end of
seventy-two hours, the director must either release the patient
or apply for involuntary commitment of the patient. 5
Voluntary and informal admissions are preferred to invol-
untary admissions. 6 The apparent legislative intent that invol-
41. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
42. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.15 (McKinney 1978).
43. Id. § 9.13. A hospital director may receive as a patient "any suitable person in
need of care and treatment, who voluntarily makes written application therefore." Id.
The applicant must have a "mental illness for which in-patient care and treatment in a
hospital is appropriate." Id. § 9.01. Further, the applicant must be told and be able to
understand that he is applying to a mental institution, and that he is subject to provi-
sions governing release and conversion to involuntary status. Id. § 9.17(a). Finally, the
Mental Health Information Service must conduct a yearly review of the patient's status.
Id. § 9.25(a).
44. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15.7(a) (1980).
45. Id. § 15.7(b). During the 72 hour period, the director must have two physicians
examine the patient and report their findings and conclusions separately to him. Id.
46. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.21, 9.23 (McKinney 1978).
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untary admission be the admission status of last resort, and that
informal be preferred to voluntary admission, however, is real-
ized only partially in New York City. Informal status is virtually
never used. Several practitioners interviewed said that few pa-
tients understand the distinction between the voluntary and in-
formal statuses well enough to know to ask for informal admis-
sion. They suggested that even though the hospital is obligated
to explain these statuses to patients, 47 it often does not. Infor-
mal status is disfavored among practitioners in New York City
because a disturbed patient simply may leave at any time,
thereby terminating ongoing treatment. Some practitioners ex-
pressed concern that the hospital might be liable if a released
informal patient harmed someone."8
Hospital staff reported that patients seldom are converted
on hospital initiative, from involuntary to voluntary status. Staff
are reluctant to convert patients to voluntary status unless they
believe that the patients are sincerely motivated to accept treat-
ment. Involuntary patients in New York sometimes convert to
voluntary status in hope of signing themselves out of the
hospital.
The law's preference for informal and voluntary admissions
reflects the notion that care and treatment should be provided
in the least restrictive manner. Unlike many jurisdictions,49 New
York does not provide involuntary patients with a comprehen-
sive statutory right to the least restrictive treatment alternative,
including a right to noninstitutional placement when appropri-
ate. In fact, the Mental Health Act precludes the initial place-
ment of an involuntary patient in a non-hospital setting."
47. See id. § 9.17(a)(3).
48. The supreme court, appellate division, however, has held that no such liability
attaches. See Paradies v. Benedictine Hospital, 77 A.D.2d 757, 758, 431 N.Y.S.2d 175,
177, appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 1006, 417 N.E.2d 94, 435 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980).
49. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325.1(a) (West 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91
/2, § 2-102(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 630.115(1)(10) (Vernon
Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 37.1-84.1(6) (Supp. 1983); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.61(1)(b)(3)(e)
(West Supp. 1983-1984).
50. See N.Y. MENTAL. HYG. LAW § 9.01 (McKinney 1978) (defining "in need of invol-
untary care and treatment" as having "a mental illness for which care and treatment as a
patient in a hospital is essential" (emphasis added)). After initial placement in a hospi-
tal, a patient may be conditionally released into the community. See id. § 29.15 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1983-1984).
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The Court of Appeals of New York has recognized, however,
that involuntarily committed patients have a due process right
to the least restrictive institutional placement. In Kesselbrenner
v. Anonymous,5" the court held unconstitutional a statutory pro-
vision that authorized the confinement of a dangerously men-
tally ill person, who had been neither charged with nor con-
victed of a crime, in Matteawan State Hospital, a correctional
facility for mentally ill convicts.52 In reaching this result, the
court said: "To subject a person to a greater deprivation of per-
sonal liberty than necessary to achieve the purpose for which he
is being confined is, it is clear, violative of due process. ' '53 The
court concluded that no reasonable relationship existed between
such punitive confinement and the therapeutic purpose sought
to be achieved.54 In addition, the court quoted with approval
from an opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia:
[T]he principle of the least restrictive alternative consistent with
the legitimate purposes of a commitment inheres in the very na-
ture of civil committment. . . . A statute sanctioning such a dras-
tic curtailment of the rights of citizens must be narrowly, even
grudgingly, construed in order to avoid deprivations of liberty
without due process of law.5
The court held that only confinement in a mental health facility
was acceptable.5 6 Kesselbrenner directly addressed the proper
placement of an institutionalized patient.57 Its -rationale argua-
bly applies, however, not to just where a patient should be
placed, but to whether the patient should be subject to involun-
tary hospitalization. The Family Court of New York County
51. 33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d 903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973).
52. Id. at 167, 305 N.E.2d at 906, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
53. Id. at 165, 305 N.E.2d at 905, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 892 (citing, inter alia, Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)).
54. Id. at 166, 305 N.E.2d at 905, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
55. Id. at 167, 305 N.E.2d at 906, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 894 (quoting Covington v. Harris,
419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
56. Id. at 167-68, 305 N.E.2d at 906-07, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
57. Other jurisdictions also have recognized that the least restrictive alternative doc-
trine applies to alternate dispositions within the hospital. E.g., Covington at 623-24;
Ploof v. Brooks, 342 F. Supp. 999, 1005 (D. Vt. 1972). See also Department of Health &
Rehab. Servs. v. Owens, 305 So. 2d 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (Boyer, J., dissenting);
Application of D.D., 118 N.J. Super. 1, 7-8, 285 A.2d 283, 287 (1971).
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used a similar rationale in In re Andrea B.58 to hold that a four-
teen year old patient who challenged her continued involuntary
hospitalization should be released because her needs could be
met by services less restrictive than hospitalization. The court
reasoned that "substantive due process requires adherence to
the principle of the least restrictive alternative. The doctrine of
least restrictive alternative comprehends not only the degree of
physical restraint but the environment, including fellow pa-
tients, to which the individual is confined." 59 Furthermore, even
though a governmental purpose is legitimate and substantial, it
must not be achieved by "means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." 0
Although the precedential value of In re Andrea B. is dubi-
ous, the decision of the Court of Appeals in Kesselbrenner has
implications regarding involuntary civil patients. Kesselbrenner
qualifies the statutory language requiring hospital placement of
involuntary patients"' by suggesting that, on constitutional
grounds, the particular hospital chosen must be the least restric-
tive appropriate setting, that the placement within that hospital
be the least restrictive, and that the actual treatment adminis-
tered be the least restrictive.6 2
Two cases currently pending in New York City go beyond
Kesselbrenner and present the issue of whether patients are en-
titled to receive treatment in the least restrictive environment
upon release or discharge from a psychiatric hospital. These
cases, Klostermann v. Cuomo"' and Joanne S. v. Carey,"' were
refiled in the supreme court after the court of appeals unani-
mously reversed the appellate division's holdings that the com-
58. 94 Misc. 2d 919, 405 N.Y.2d 977 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1978).
59. Id. at 925, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 981 (citation omitted).
60. Id.
61. Kesselbrenner, 33 N.Y.2d at 167, 305 N.E.2d at 906-07, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 894
(explaining N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 901 (McKinney 1978)). See also supra note 50.
62. Kesselbrenner, 33 N.Y.2d at 167, 305 N.E.2d at 906-07, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
63. Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247
(1984), rev'g, 91 A.D.2d 593, 458 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1st Dep't 1982) refiled, No. 11270/82
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984).
64. Id., rev'g, Joanne S. v. Carey, 94 A.D.2d 691, 462 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1983)
refiled, No. 18493/82 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984).
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plaints failed to present justiciable controversies. 5 The plaintiffs
in Klostermann, were each treated in a psychiatric hospital and
discharged, thereafter joining the homeless wandering the
streets of New York City."6 The plaintiffs contend that they are
entitled under State law to receive appropriate residential place-
ment, supervision, and care.67 The plaintiffs in Joanne S., who
are currently hospitalized at the Manhattan Psychiatric Center,
have been found ready for release or discharge, but have not
been released or discharged because adequate residential place-
ments are unavailable.6 " They seek their release into community
treatment settings.6 9 The plaintiffs in both cases seek to compel
the development of sufficient community alternatives for the
plaintiffs and the members of the classes they represent.7"
Statutes of many states authorize the courts to order place-
ment outside of a hospital.7' For example, Virginia permits its
courts to order "outpatient treatment, day treatment in a hospi-
tal, night treatment in a hospital, referral to a community
65. The cases were consolidated for argument in the court of appeals, which only
addressed the justiciability issue and not the merits of the plaintiffs' causes of action.
See Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d at 535, 463 N.E.2d at 593, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 252. If the mer-
its are ultimately decided in favor of the plaintiffs, the results could be as far-reaching
for the mentally ill as the Willowbrook consent decree has been for the mentally re-
tarded. The Willowbrook consent decree was signed by then New York Governor Hugh
L. Carey on April 22, 1975, and subsequently was approved by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York in New York State Ass'n for Retarded Chil-
dren v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), enforced, 551 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D.N.Y.
1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 277 (1983). The decree required, among other things, that the defendants "take all
steps necessary to develop and operate a broad range of non-institutional community
facilities and programs" to meet the needs of persons residing at the Willowbrook State
Developmental Center, now the Staten Island Developmental Center. Id. at 717. Despite
the defendants' failure to comply with the decree in several respects, see New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 551 F. Supp. at 1167, 1192, the decree has resulted
in the care for mentally retarded persons becoming primarily community-based rather
than institution-oriented, see id. at 1168, and in a notable increase of community resi-
dences for the mentally retarded, see id. at 1188.
66. Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d at 531, 463 N.E.2d at 591, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
67. Id. These claims are based upon N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(f)-(h) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1984-1985), which provides for the discharge and conditional release of pa-
tients to the community.
68. Klostermann, 61 N.Y.2d at 534, 463 N.E.2d at 592, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 533-34, 463 N.E.2d at 592, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
71. See Miller & Fiddleman, Outpatient Commitment: Treatment in the Least Re-
strictive Environment, 35 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 147 (1984).
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mental health clinic, or other such appropriate treatment modal-
ities as may be necessary to meet the needs of the individual. ' 72
Several interviewees stated that, in principle, they would favor a
statutory amendment giving New York courts this authority, but
that it would make little practical difference until new alterna-
tive facilities and programs were developed.
The primary obstacle to application of the least restrictive
alternative doctrine in New York is not that the statute fails to
require it73 or that the actors in the commitment process are in-
sensitive to the merits of alternative treatment,7' but that alter-
natives to the hospital are virtually nonexistent. For example, in
the Bronx, 1,200 residential beds are needed but only 218 now
exist. Alternatives such as community residential facilities 75 are
drying up because of rising real estate costs in New York City76
72. VA. CODE § 37.1-67.3 (1984). See also Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540A (1983-
1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(13)(a)(3)-(5)(West Supp. 1983-1984).
73. The statute provides mental patients an express right to less restrictive treat-
ment only in one limited situation. That is, a patient may be placed in physical re-
straints "only if less restrictive techniques have been clinically determined to be inap-
propriate or insufficient to avoid" serious injury to the patient or others. N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 33.04(b) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). In addition to not requiring applica-
tion of the least restrictive alternative doctrine in all cases, the New York statute, like
those of most states, fails to define the doctrine within the mental health context. The
definition varies among states that have defined it. For a representative sample of state
definitions, see GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(10) (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 202A.011(7) (Interim
Supp. 1982); Mo. REV. STAT. § 630.005.1(18) (Vernon Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-
1-3(d) (1978).
74. See C. KIESLER, E. GOFFMAN, AsYLuMs: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATIONS OF
MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1961). Goldstein, The Sociology of Mental
Health and Illness, 5 ANN. REV. Soc. 381 (1979); Kiesler, Mental Hospitals and Alterna-
tive Care: Non-institutionalization as Potential Public Policy, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
349, 350 (1982); The New York Code of Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Com-
missioner of Mental Health aspire to shift the locus of mental health services away from
institutional settings. See also N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14 § 36.1 (1982) ("The civil rights of
mentally disabled persons require that such persons be treated and served in the least
restrictive setting possible in which treatment or service goals can be met.").
75. "'Community residential facility' means any facility subject to licensure by the
office of mental retardation and developmental disabilities which provides a supervised
residence or residential respite for services for mentally disabled persons. Such term does
not include family care homes." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.36(a)(1) (McKinney Supp.
1983-1984).
76. Single room occupancy hotels and apartments that were once converted into
community residential facilities are now being converted into condominiums and cooper-
atives, thereby reducing the number of available units and driving up their costs.
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and because of insufficient state funding appropriations.77 Also,
the alternatives that are available are plagued by long waiting
lists and formidable bureaucratic intake requirements that can
result in placement delays of one to two months or more 8.7 The
creation of more alternatives is an obvious prerequisite to the
effectiveness of legal or regulatory reforms aimed at promoting
the use of alternative treatment. 79 Under the existing statutory
admission scheme, however, whenever appropriate, hospital staff
and MHIS attorneys should explain fully to respondents their
option of entering the hospital on an informal or voluntary basis.
E. Prehearing Examinations
At least two examinations are required when an emergency
admission is sought, the first prior to admission and the second
within forty-eight hours.80 To retain a patient involuntarily be-
yond the fifteen day emergency hospitalization period, the two-
physician certification procedure must be used.8
Two physician's certificates in New York often include gen-
eral and insubstantial information. In addition, the certificates
frequently are not filed within the fifteen days allowed. Typi-
cally, however, judges overlook such "technicalities" and con-
sider cases on the merits.
The emphasis on multiple and independent examinations in
77. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, n.*, Joanne S. v. Carey, consolidated on
appeal with Klosterman v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247
(1984) ("There is also evidence that the state is not even using all of the money currently
appropriated for the development of community residences.")(citation omitted). In addi-
tion, the federal government spends over 70% of its mental health funds on hospitaliza-
tion. Kiesler, supra note 74, at 1323.
78. The delay results from the time required to process a "Request for Residential
Placement" (Form 418) through the Department of Social Services. Each placement de-
cision made by the Department of Social Services is based on a Form 418, not on a
clinical examination of the patient.
79. The Local and Unified Services Law, N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW art. 41 (McKinney
1978), requires extensive planning of community residential and treatment services but
does not actually require creation of services themselves. See, e.g., id. § 41.21. Further-
more, state matching funds for construction costs and other capital expenditures con-
nected with creating these services, id. § 41.03(9), must be authorized by the legislature
after the Commissioner of Mental Health has requested and the Governor has recom-
mended the appropriations. See id. § 41.27.
80. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39(a) (McKinney 1978).
81. See id. § 9.39(b) (McKinney 1978).
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the prehearing stage is a strength of the commitment system in
New York. Given the imprecision of the clinical endeavor, par-
ticularly as it concerns the prediction of future behavior, 8 the
reliability of commitment decisionmaking should rise with the
number of clinical opinions presented. This assumes, of course,
that each examiner conducts a thorough and competent
evaluation.
A problem with these examinations in New York is the diffi-
culty some foreign-born examining physicians have communicat-
ing clearly in English. There is an obvious risk that the patient
who fails to understand the physician who examines him will
also fail to provide reliable information. In addition, the physi-
cian who is unable to grasp the meaning of statements made by
his patient is likely to arrive at an imperfect diagnosis opinion.
Finally, unless the physician is able to communicate his opinion
clearly in court, the judge's decision may be misinformed.
Therefore, examining physicians should be fluent in both oral
and written English.
Requiring fluency among the medical staff may resolve the
problems of communication only partially, however. Many peo-
ple who become respondents in New York City commitment
proceedings speak English poorly or not at all. These people re-
quire an interpreter or a physician who speaks their language. In
hospitals with large non-English speaking populations, stand-by
interpreters and bilingual physicians are available. In many hos-
pitals, however, the cost of providing such a service may be pro-
hibitive. A better solution may be to maintain a list of interpret-
ers available in the community to assist in the evaluation of non-
English speaking respondents. In any event, if an interpreter is
needed, it should be the responsibility of the hospital to arrange
for one.
Another aspect of prehearing examinations is the right of
respondents to seek an independent medical opinion. 3 In New
York, a judge may appoint a physician to examine the respon-
dent upon the respondent's request. The judge selects an exam-
iner from a list maintained by the court. Independent examina-
82. See J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL
TECHNIQUES (1981).
83. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.09(b)(2) (McKinney 1978).
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tions seldom are requested, however, because arranging such an
examination may delay the commitment hearing for a week or
more. MHIS attorneys recommend independent examinations
only in exceptional cases because the independent examiner's
findings usually agree with those of the hospital examiner, and
thereby reinforce the state's case for commitment."'
A weakness of the New York statutory scheme is the failure
to provide respondents the right to refuse to speak with the hos-
pital's examining physician. As a matter of practice, physicians
in New York do not recognize such a right and, accordingly, do
not advise the respondent of any such right prior to the
evaluation.
In several states, respondents have the right to remain si-
lent during prehearing evaluations. 5 Even in jurisdictions where
no such legal right has been recognized, many believe that the
examining physician has an ethical duty to advise the respon-
dent how statements made during the evaluation will be used.
Patients often are bewildered and confused during the early
stages of the commitment proceeding. The "silent treatment"
given them by staff of the detaining facility serves only to in-
crease resentment and noncooperation. Despite the suggestion
that informed patients will be discouraged from answering ques-
tions truthfully, many examiners report that respondents appre-
ciate the honesty of a physician who is forthright and become
more cooperative and trusting as a result.86
Controversy surrounds the issue of doctor-patient privilege
applying to communications between a respondent and exam-
iner. Most scholars deny any such privilege exists during a
court-ordered evaluation.87 If the examining physician is also the
84. Because of the infrequency of independent examinations, it is impossible to esti-
mate how frequently they would disagree with the initial hospital examinations.
85. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1100-02 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
86. PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at HI-46.
87. See, e.g., Orland, Evidence in Psychiatric Settings, 11 GONz. L. REV. 665, 685-86
(1976); Note, Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1303-13 (1974). See also Proposed Rule of Evidence, Rule 504(d)(3),
reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 241 (1972) (exception to psychotherapist-patient privilege).
Other commentators concede the nonexistence of the privilege during court-ordered
evaluations but suggest that these evaluations are inherently coercive. See Aronson,
Should the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Ex-
amination?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 55, 70-71 (1973); Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psycho-
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treating physician, however, the matter is not so clear. Laws in a
few states prevent the treating physician of a respondent from
evaluating him in a commitment proceeding. 8 In Columbus,
Ohio, for example, each respondent is examined by a "court doc-
tor" and by an "independent doctor."8 9 The independent doctor
is bound by the doctor-patient privilege; the court doctor is not.
So long as the treating physician explains to his patient before
beginning the evaluation that he will provide the results of the
evaluation to the court, there should be no objection to the testi-
mony of the treating physician in court.9 0 If, however, he has not
so advised his patient, he may violate ethical standards by re-
vealing his findings.9 '
As a general matter, though, the prehearing examination ef-
fectively screens many persons who do not meet the criteria for
commitment. Almost half of all persons presented for emergency
involuntary admission at Bellevue Hospital are screened out and
discharged as a result of the initial examination. Of those admit-
ted involuntarily, the majority are discharged within fifteen
days, regardless of whether a hearing is held.
F. Prehearing Treatment
In many states, involuntary patients are accorded a quali-
fied right to refuse treatment prior to an adjudication of com-
mittability.92  The New York statutes are silent regarding
therapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (1980).
88. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.3(d) (1981).
89. See I. KEILITZ, OHIO, supra note 8, at 9 (1982).
90. Requiring examining physicians to explain the nature, purpose, and conse-
quences of their examination, may improperly cast physicians in the role of patient coun-
sel. Perhaps this function would be more properly, and probably more effectively, han-
dled by the MHIS. If the MHIS can give each patient an accurate and clear explanation
of the nature, purpose, and consequences of the examination, that would be sufficient.
What is important is that each respondent receives the explanation. We recommend the
physician give that explanation only because he seems in a better position to provide it.
91. See, e.g., American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics § 9 (1957),
reprinted in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1751 (W.T. Reich ed. 1978); American Psychi-
atric Association, Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable
to Psychiatry § 9, reprinted in 130 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1057, 1063 (1973). See also Com-
ment, Status of the Emergency Room Psychotherapist: Privacy Rites, 30 UCLA L. REV.
1316 (1983), (mental patients' right to privacy considered from perspective of the
psychotherapist).
92. See Perr, Refusing Treatment - Who Shall Decide?, 10 AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
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whether patients may be treated during the prehearing period.
As a matter of practice, treatment ordinarily begins soon after a
patient is admitted and continues throughout the commitment
period, regardless of whether the commitment is contested in a
hearing.
The narrower issue of whether patients should be under the
influence of medication during hearings is a controversial ques-
tion. Some argue that a properly medicated respondent is better
able to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense.
Critics contend that although medication may enable the re-
spondent to think more clearly, its side effects may create an
appearance of mental illness regardless of the respondent's true
condition. If the respondent is medicated during the prehearing
period, the treating physician should inform the court, the re-
spondent's attorney, and the attorney representing the state or
the hospital what medications were administered and what con-
sequenses these medications are likely to have on the respon-
dent's behavior during the hearing and on his ability to assist
counsel.9 3
III. Counsel for the Respondent
A. Mental Health Information Service
Respondents in New York are entitled to the assistance of
counsel throughout the commitment process. Immediately upon
admission to the hospital, a respondent may consult an attorney
regarding his or her right to challenge the hospitalization in
court. If a respondent initiates such a challenge, he or she is en-
& L. BULL. 233 (1982); Hassenfeld & Grumet, A Study of the Right to Refuse Treat-
ment, 12 AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. BULL. 65, 66-67 (1984); Rockford, More on the
Right to Refuse Treatment: Brother Fox and the Mentally Ill in New York, 11 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 19 (1983).
93. This recommendation is not intended to remedy the lack of any statutory lan-
guage relating to prehearing patient treatment. Its intent is more limited: if the respon-
dent is under the influence of medication, what would be done to preserve the integrity
of the commitment hearing? This narrower issue is the less controversial.
The broader issue involves balancing of the respondent's right to be free of un-
wanted medication and the state's interest in protecting the mental health of its citizens.
One way of achieving this balance may be to define the types of medication which may
be administered pending hearing rather than to define the required nature of patient
conduct.
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titled to be represented by counsel at the hearing.
Although not required to do so by statute, MHIS attorneys
in New York City generally represent patients in commitment
hearings. The statute directs the MHIS to: (1) study the admis-
sion and retention of all patients, (2) inform patients of their
rights, (3) provide the court with all relevant information about
the patient,94 (4) provide services and assistance to patients and
their families, and (5) investigate cases of alleged patient mis-
treatment and take legal action to protect patients.9 5 Addition-
ally, the MHIS also employs social workers who investigate al-
ternative treatment programs and, when appropriate, work with
the legal staff to pursue transfer of patients to less restrictive
settings. This function of the MHIS, though less visible than
that of providing legal representation, is vitally important if the
least restrictive alternative doctrine is to have any meaning in
New York. 6
All involuntary patients in New York must be advised at
the time of admission of the availabililty of assistance from the
MHIS 9 7 The involuntary patient may use the MHIS throughout
his hospital stay.18 Indeed, upon receipt of a patient's record,"9
the MHIS becomes the patient's legal representative until he is
discharged or becomes a voluntary patient.
MHIS attorneys are available to represent all patients, re-
gardless of their financial abilities. While, of course, patients are
entitled to retain private legal assistance, some MHIS attorneys
advise against the retention of private counsel because so few
have any meaningful knowledge or experience in the mental
health law field. In the event that a private attorney becomes
involved in a commitment case, the court may request that the
MHIS attorney continue in an advisory role.
94. Whenever a commitment hearing is scheduled, the MHIS staff prepares a mem-
orandum consisting of. a brief history of the patient, a summary of the medical staff's
reasons for seeking retention of patient, and any arrangements that might advance the
patient's release.
95. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.09 (McKinney 1978).
96. This function is discussed more fully infra notes 132-133 and accompanying
text.
97. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.07 (McKinney 1978).
98. Id.
99. An involuntary patient's record must be sent to the MHIS within five days of
his admission. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.11 (McKinney 1978).
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B. Role of Counsel
Because of their varied responsibilities, MHIS attorneys are
highly vulnerable to charges of conflict of interest. Of particular
concern is their dual responsibility for representing the patient
and providing relevant information regarding the patient's case
to the court. Most observers in New York City agree, however,
that MHIS attorneys are able to provide the court with the in-
formation it needs without compromising the patient's right to a
fair hearing.0 °
The MHIS attorneys act as zealous advocates for their cli-
ents' expressed wishes. Although they ordinarily argue for re-
lease of their clients, they bristle at the suggestion that they are
insensitive to their clients' best interests. They frequently advise
clients to accept a period of needed hospitalization, but once a
client has decided to contest the hospitalization, their responsi-
bility as counsel leaves no choice but to argue for release. 01
Occasionally, the adversarial stance of the attorneys leads to
friction between the MHIS and the medical staff. While not al-
ways pleasant, such friction is healthy when the issue is treat-
ment on the one hand and liberty on the other.
IV. The Hearing: Determining Committability
A. When Hearings Are Held
New York law does not provide for "automatic" commit-
ment hearings. Rather, commitment hearings are held only upon
the request of the patient, any relative or friend of the patient,
or the MHIS. 0 2 Hearings to challenge emergency admissions
may be requested anytime after admission;0 3 hearings to chal-
100. One MHIS staff member suggested that the responsibility to provide informa-
tion to the court, in fact, may be viewed as an opportunity to present information about
the case in the light most favorable to the patient's expressed wishes.
101. Attorneys are ethically bound to advise clients regarding available options and
then to zealously pursue the course of action desired by the client. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). See also Andalman & Chambers, Effective
Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, A Polemic, and A Proposal,
45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974); Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings:
Emerging Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 816 (1974); Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil
Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540 (1975).
102. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.31, 9.39 (McKinney 1978).
103. Id. § 9.31(a).
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lenge admission on a two-physician certification may be re-
quested anytime within sixty days of admission. 104
In New York City, few involuntary hospitalizations entail
hearings. Hearings are rare for several reasons. The MHIS staff
may persuade the patient not to contest the hospitalization, ei-
ther because it would be futile or because the best interests of
the patient call for a period of treatment in the hospital. Other
cases are settled, often with placement of the patient in a less
restrictive treatment program.,"5
New York is one of only a few states that permit involun-
tary hospitalization without a court hearing.'06 Given the pres-
ence of the MHIS in the hospitals, requiring a hearing in every
case may be unnecessary. In addition, the burden that automatic
hearings would place on the courts and the hospital personnel
who would have to participate in them may be prohibitive.
While courts in some jurisdictions have ruled that auto-
matic hearings are constitutionally required,0 7 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has upheld the
New York procedure. 08 For the New York procedure to protect
adequately the liberty interests of involuntary patients, however,
it is essential that the MHIS staff make themselves available to
every involuntary patient. It is not enough that the patient be
advised of the availability of the MHIS; without the individual
assistance of someone from the MHIS, the patient cannot be ex-
pected to make an informed and intelligent decision about
whether to challenge the commitment.
Automatic hearings in and of themselves do not make the
commitment process better or fairer; indeed, in many jurisdic-
tions, mandatory hearings are pro forma exercises. Also, a full,
adversarial hearing is a costly endeavor. Requiring a hearing in
every involuntary civil commitment case may severely burden
104. Id. § 9.39(a).
105. The MHIS social workers play a key role in locating alternatives to hospitaliza-
tion and, thus, in effecting release. The least restrictive alternative doctrine is applied in
practice in very few jurisdictions. One reason is that no one involved in the commitment
process assumes the responsibility for investigating the availability of alternative treat-
ment programs.
106. In most states a hearing must be held within about five days of the patient's
admission. PROVISIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at IV-6.
107. See, e.g., Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
108. Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983).
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the courts, the hospitals, and the MHIS, and might guarantee
pro forma hearings. Because of the loss of liberty and potential
for stigma that results from involuntary commitment, however,
it is perhaps better to risk clogged dockets than improper com-
mitment. Nevertheless, if the MHIS attorneys carefully consider
each case and insist on a hearing for every case in which the
patient's committability is questionable, the utility of the New
York procedure may outweigh the dangers of not having auto-
matic hearings.
B. Characteristics of Hearings
A respondent's request for hearing must be given in writing
to the hospital director, who promptly forwards it and a copy of
the patient's record to the court and the MHIS. The court then
schedules a hearing within five days from the date it receives the
request.109
Commitment hearings are held weekly at Bellevue Hospital
and at Manhattan Psychiatric Center. Hearings generally are
not held in the other hospitals in Manhattan.'" Patients in
those hospitals must be transported to Bellevue or Manhattan
Psychiatric Center, and testifying physicians, hospital security
guards, and MHIS staff must travel there. Patients from other
hospitals who request hearings and are only marginally commit-
table often are released to avoid the inconvenience of a hearing.
As a result, the proportion of involuntary patients from Bellevue
and Manhattan Psychiatric Center whose cases are heard in
court is said to be considerably higher than that from other hos-
pitals in Manhattan.
The location of hearings should not be determined only by
convenience to the court and hospital, but should also take into
account the interests of the patient. Holding hearings in other
hospitals would avoid the problems of patient transport and
spare patients the indignities and discomfort of supervised
transportation. Because hospital staff rarely attend hearings
held at other hospitals, a patient may lose his opportunity to
confront and cross-examine key witnesses. Alternatively, hospi-
109. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.31, 9.39 (McKinney 1978).
110. On rare occasions, however, the court hears cases in these other hospitals when
warranted by special circumstances.
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tals may discharge patients rather than subject their staff to the
inconvenience of attending hearings in other facilities. This oc-
curs frequently in New York City.
Commitment hearings, which are generally closed to the
public, are conducted by justices of the New York Supreme
Court. Typically present at hearings are the respondents, five or
six attorneys, four or five psychiatrists, several police and secur-
ity officers, and several court personnel. Hearings are informal
and somewhat disorganized. In a number of cases observed by
the authors, necessary commitment papers (physician certifi-
cates) were unavailable, hearing participants were not prepared
to go forward when cases were called, and, in some cases, pa-
tients were not present in court. As a result, valuable court time
was wasted, general confusion prevailed, and cases were some-
times adjourned until later in the day or the next week. On a
typical hearing day, about twenty cases are scheduled but only
about four are heard. Some are dismissed because the patient
and the hospital have reached an agreement. Many others, how-
ever, are continued and must be argued later.
The New York statute provides that hearings may be ad-
journed for an unspecified period of time.' Hearings on emer-
gency admissions may be adjourned only upon request of the pa-
tient; 2 hearings on two-physician certification admissions may
be adjourned upon the request of either the patient or the hospi-
tal. 1 3 Requests for adjournment are common in New York City.
MHIS attorneys request them to arrange placement in commu-
nity treatment programs. Hospital attorneys request them if the
required paperwork is incomplete or the necessary medical wit-
nesses are unavailable. In addition, judges sometimes adjourn
cases simply because they are unable to remain at the hospital
long enough to hear all the cases on the docket. As a result,
cases frequently are not heard until several weeks after the re-
quest for hearing is made. This overuse of adjournments is the
single most deficient feature of the New York commitment
system.
111. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.31(c), 9.39(a) (McKinney 1978).
112. Id. § 9.39(a).
113. See id. § 9.31(c).
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C. Criteria for Commitment
The criterion for emergency admission in New York is
mental illness for which immediate observation, care, and treat-
ment in a hospital is appropriate and which is likely to result in
serious harm to self or others."" "Likelihood to result in serious
harm" is defined as
(1) substantial risk of physical harm to himself as manifested by
threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other
conduct demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself, or (2)
substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested
by homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed
in reasonable fear of serious physical harm."'
"In need of care and treatment" means that a person has a
mental illness for which inpatient care and treatment in a hospi-
tal is appropriate." 6
The criteria for involuntary admission on a two-physician
certification are that the respondent is mentally ill and in need
of, involuntary care and treatment.'1 7 "'In need of involuntary
care and treatment' means that a person has a mental illness for
which care and treatment as a patient in a hospital is essential
to the person's welfare and whose judgment is so impaired that
he is unable to understand the need for such care and treat-
ment." 118 Although dangerousness is not specified by statute as a
requirement for involuntary commitment on a two-physician
certification, the appellate division of the supreme court has
ruled:
Substantive due process requires that the continued confinement
of an individual must be based upon a finding that the person to
be committed poses a real and present threat of substantial harm
to himself or others. . . . Such criteria would authorize the con-
tinued confinement of an individual whose mental illness
manifests itself in neglect or refusal to care for himself, where
such neglect or refusal presents a threat of substantial harm to
114. Id. § 9.39(a).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 9.01.
117. Id. § 9.27(a).
118. Id. § 9.01.
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his own well-being." 9
The burden of proof in the commitment proceedings is on
the state. In emergency admissions hearings the standard of
proof is "reasonable cause to believe" that the criteria are satis-
fied.120 In medical certification hearings the standard of proof is
clear and convincing evidence.' 2 ' The reasonable cause standard
is used in other jurisdictions only in probable cause hearings to
determine whether a patient should be detained, but not com-
mitted for purposes of treatment, pending a hearing on the
question of commitment. 22 The United States Supreme Court
has ruled that, because commitment entails a "massive curtail-
ment of liberty," the state must establish committability by
clear and convincing evidence. 2 3 The statutory standard of
proof for emergency admission in New York, therefore, may be
constitutionally unsound.
Observers in New York report that the judges reliably apply
the appropriate criteria when making commitment decisions.
When a judge hears a case, he has before him an MHIS trial
memorandum that sets forth the precise standard and the ques-
tions presented. Nevertheless, in hearings observed by the au-
thors, the judges did not always clearly address the criteria re-
quiring proof. Whether respondents in two-physician
certification proceedings were able to understand the need for
care and treatment was overlooked in virtually every case.
D. Counsel for the Hospital
Cases involving patients at state hospitals are handled by
attorneys from the New York Attorney General's Office. Munici-
pal and private hospitals, however, are not always represented.
In recent years, the judges have begun to require the presence of
counsel for the hospital in every commitment case. Attorneys
119. Scopes v. Shah, 59 A.D.2d 203, 205, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (1977) (citations
omitted).
120. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39(a) (McKinney 1978).
121. Scopes, 59 A.D.2d at 206, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 913-14.
122. See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 387-88 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v.
Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1098 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Humphrey v.
Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
123. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979).
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from the Office of General Counsel of the City's Health and
Hospitals Corporation now appear in commitment cases involv-
ing patients in city hospitals. Private attorneys appear on behalf
of the private hospitals.
Nothing in the law in New York requires that the hospital
be represented at the hearing. Reportedly, the practice of attor-
ney representation of the hospital has developed out of a con-
cern that, in the absence of this representation, the prosecuting
function would be performed by the judge or the psychiatrist,
whose objectivity would then be called into question.
E. Assignment of Judges
Commitment cases are heard on a rotating basis by justices
of the civil division of the supreme court. Judges in Manhattan
ordinarily hear commitment cases for one week and then move
on to other assignments. Because no one judge presides very
often, there is little opportunity for the development of an ex-
pertise in commitment law and practice among the judges. Re-
portedly, judges in the Bronx are assigned to hear commitment
cases for two months each year. As a result, judges in the Bronx
are much more sensitive to the unique issues in civil commit-
ment than are judges in Manhattan.
There is general agreement that the quality and knowledge
of the judges who preside over commitment proceedings in Man-
hattan varies greatly. Attorneys and mental health professionals
alike are critical of many judges for knowing little of the applica-
ble law. Others are concerned that judges are generally ignorant
of concepts of mental illness and psychiatric treatment. Report-
edly, judges assigned to the mental health rotation are provided
with a book containing information on civil commitment law.
Additionally, lunchtime seminars are held occasionally to edu-
cate judges. Still, many observers in New York City contend
that improved judicial education in this area is essential.
Another problem with the Manhattan rotation system is the
lack of coordination among the judges who sit from week to
week. If a case is continued from one week to the next and a
different judge is sitting, the "sense" of the case is lost. Essen-
tially, the proceeding must begin anew. The MHIS attorneys
favor the rotation system, however, for fear that a permanent
judge might, by chance, be the "wrong" judge and some patients
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would never be released. Although the present system seems
ripe for judge-shopping, 24 the MHIS attorneys report that it
rarely occurs because (1) the attorneys often do not know which
judges will be sitting from week to week, and (2) very few pa-
tients are willing to remain in the hospital an additional week on
the chance of getting a more sympathetic judge.
F. Witnesses at the Hearing
The New York statutes do not require the presence of medi-
cal experts at commitment hearings. In practice, however, an ex-
amining or treating psychiatrist - typically the chief psychia-
trist of the patient's hospital ward - is present to testify in
virtually every case. In addition, the court receives the certifi-
cates of physicians whose examinations are required by law.125
Although the proper role of the testifying psychiatrist is to
present medical evidence in a neutral manner, observers in New
York City believe that psychiatrists there feel obligated to sup-
port the case for commitment and direct their testimony accord-
ingly. Many of these psychiatrists apparently do not understand
how the adversary system is supposed to work and naturally be-
come defensive when their expertise is called into question. The
consensus among judges in New York is that psychiatrists who
present neutral testimony are the most persuasive.
Some New York judges believe that the examiner's testi-
mony should be the key factor influencing the court. Others are
more interested in the testimony of family members and other
lay witnesses about specific examples of the patient's abnormal
behavior. Too often, however, these witnesses are not available
at the hearings, and the judge must rely on unsubstantiated alle-
gations for this evidence.
Testifying in court is a highly distasteful experience for
many mental health professionals. Physicians, who are unaccus-
tomed to having their opinions challenged by persons having no
medical expertise, resent being forced to explain and justify
their conclusions for the court. Mental health professionals who
testify in commitment cases frequently have had no formal
124. "Judge-shopping" in this context is the practice of continuing a case for hear-
ing on a day when a more sympathetic judge is sitting.
125. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27 (McKinney 1978).
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training in the law and do not understand what is expected of
them in the commitment hearing. The presentation of orienta-
tion programs for hospital personnel on topics in the area of law
and psychiatry could go far toward helping physicians both feel
comfortable in court and provide higher quality information. Ac-
cordingly, staff of the MHIS in cooperation with counsel for the
psychiatric hospitals in the city develop and conduct orientation
or education programs for mental health professionals working
in the city hospitals.
G. Rules of Evidence and Procedure
Because of the relatively informal manner in which hearings
are conducted, judges sometimes admit evidence that would be
declared inadmissible in more formal trials. One judge reported
that the rules of evidence and procedure simply are not applied
in civil commitment cases. In his words: "Everything goes in or-
der to get all the information out that is relevant and of
interest."' 26
Commitment hearings should not be entirely exempt from
the rules of evidence and procedure applicable in other civil pro-
ceedings. Because involuntary commitment is designed to serve
the best interests of the mentally ill, however, many judges and
attorneys are reluctant to apply these rules too strictly. Informa-
tion about previous psychiatric treatment is almost always con-
sidered, although MHIS attorneys often object to introduction
of this evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant and prejudi-
cial. Of course, information about previous treatment is highly
relevant to the court's understanding of a patient's diagnosis,
prognosis, and treatment plan. Indeed, given the chronicity of
many mental disorders, it is inescapable that previous psychiat-
ric involvement would be considered.
A more compelling issue concerns the admissibility of hear-
say statements in support of an allegation of dangerousness or
other behavioral dysfunction. Commitment cases frequently are
based on the allegations of family members or other acquaint-
ances of the patient and often grow out of ongoing personal dis-
putes. As a result, the allegations and the testimony provided by
126. See supra note 11.
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lay witnesses may not always be entirely objective. Because of
this and because the emotional state of patients at the time of
the hearing may hinder their capacity to refute false testimony,
one would expect that judges would exclude evidence of this
type. However, observers in New York report that most judges
will admit this evidence. To the extent that witnesses to the pa-
tient's behavioral dysfunction are available, judges should insist
on their personal testimony, not only out of fairness to the de-
fense, but out of a concern for accuracy.
V. The Hearing: Determining Treatment
A. Considering Less Restrictive Alternatives
The interests of neither the patient nor society are served if
the treatment ordered is more intrusive or expensive than neces-
sary. The Mental Health Act does not require the court to con-
sider alternatives to inpatient treatment, nor does it permit the
court to order alternatives. 2 ' The least restrictive alternative
doctrine is apparent in the statutory provisions for hearings fol-
lowing involuntary admission on medical certification in only
one limited respect: if the court determines that "relatives of the
patient or a committee of his person are willing and able prop-
erly to care for him at some place other than a hospital, then,
upon their written consent, the court may order the transfer of
the patient to the care and custody of such relatives or such
committee." '28 Because "transfer" is not defined it is unclear
from the face of the provision whether transfer to relatives or a
committee constitutes a "release," meaning mere termination of
inpatient care,129 or "discharge," meaning release and "termina-
tion of any right to retain or treat the patient on an in-patient
basis."1 30 Thus, it is unclear whether a court's exercise of this
provision would result in an involuntary placement less restric-
tive than inpatient care or merely an absolute discharge.
This is the only provision in the New York statute that even
suggests that a hearing court might order placement less restric-
127. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
128. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31(c) (McKinney 1978).
129. Id. § 1.03(29).
130. Id. § 1.03(31).
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tive than hospitalization. Section 9.01 implies, however, that the
court's authority is limited to deciding whether treatment in a
hospital is appropriate and would not permit involuntary place-
ment outside of a hospital. This interpretation is applied in New
York City. In any event, the court rarely orders a patient dis-
charged to his family because the family is usually absent. When
the court does order discharge, it does not follow any established
procedure. Rather than requiring written consent as provided by
statute,1 3 1 the court typically asks the family members present if
they will care for the patient, and evaluates their sincerity.
As a practical matter, judges in New York City view less
restrictive alternatives as a threshold question; that is, if a less
restrictive placement is appropriate and available, involuntary
retention is not ordered. 1 2 In each case, MHIS attorneys who
represent patients at retention hearings, prepare a memorandum
for the court which quotes a New York Code of Rules and Regu-
lations provision that expresses a right to treatment in the least
restrictive setting. 33 At the hearing, an MHIS attorney may
challenge an examining physician's testimony regarding alterna-
tives through cross-examination, or may actually present an al-
ternative treatment plan to the court. One judge interviewed
stated that the MHIS usually do not realistically present de-
tailed alternatives to the court, but that in a borderline case he
would be receptive to such a presentation. He suggested that the
MHIS seldom inquire into community alternatives, but rather
131. Id. § 9.31(c).
132. This is consistent with the holdings in several federal court cases that a court
may not commit to involuntary treatment anyone for whom a less restrictive alternative
is appropriate. See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake
v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Phillip v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513, 517-18
(N.D.N.Y. 1981); Kenny v. Warden, Richmond City Jail, 476 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Va.
1979); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp 30 (E.D. Pa.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 640 (1979); Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp.
1376, 1380 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
133. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14 § 36.1 (1982). The Code provides in part:
The long-term rehabilitation of mentally disabled persons is promoted by mainte-
nance of relationships with other persons and agencies in the community, avoid-
ance of institutionalization, and minimization of disruption of life rhythms. The
civil rights of mentally disabled persons require that such persons be treated and
served in the least restrictive setting possible in which treatment or service goals
can be met.
Id. This regulatory provision has no parallel in the New York statutes.
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present legalistic, "boiler plate" arguments.
An MHIS representative, on the other hand, stated that in
most hearings they are forced to hammer away at the legal com-
mitment criteria because of lack of available alternatives. He
stated that the MHIS frequently does investigate alternatives,
but that it is difficult to arrange for a patient to be accepted in a
community treatment program before the hearing. Understanda-
bly, many judges are reluctant to refrain from ordering retention
simply because a community program exists that might be ap-
propriate for the patient. Most judges require some assurance
that the patient will be accepted by and enter the program
before they will order the patient's discharge.
B. Presenting A Treatment Plan
The criteria for involuntary commitment in a number of
states require a showing that a respondent's debilitating condi-
tion is one for which appropriate treatment is available.' The
United States Supreme Court has suggested, at least with re-
spect to nondangerous mentally ill persons that involuntary
commitment without the administration of treatment designed
to address a person's disorder is unconstitutional.' It is largely
134. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976), subsequent
appeal, 641 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1981); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.
1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1974), vacated sub nom. Gumanis v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
1052 (1974); In re Curry, 452 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Association for Retarded Citi-
zens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 470 (D.N.D. 1981); Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278 (D.
Md. 1979); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980); Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo.
1979); Lora v. Board of Ed., 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated, 623 F. 2d 248
(2d Cir. 1980); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Gary W. v. State,
437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976); Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part and remanded in
part, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
135. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-76 (1975). Specifically, the Court
said: "[A] State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual
who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members or friends." Id. at 576 (emphasis added). The Court ignored,
however, the "quid pro quo" rationale established by preceding cases, such as Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1966), and Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.2d at 784.
The quid pro quo theory, that if the state deprives a person of liberty by committing him
for treatment, the state must provide treatment, was first propounded in Birnbaum, The
Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 502-04 (1960).
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because of the right to treatment that procedures in many states
require the submission of a treatment plan at the commitment
hearing. The plan is intended to provide a basis upon which the
judge or other decisionmaker may determine the appropriate-
ness of the treatment proposed and the likelihood that such
treatment will bring about the desired change in the respon-
dent's condition.
The New York statutes require hospitals to develop and
maintain treatment plans for all patients, but fail to require that
these plans be presented at commitment hearings. 136 Although
testifying physicians typically are prepared to discuss their plans
for treatment if and when the court requests this information, it
is not standard procedure for the courts to make such re-
quests. 137 The courts should inquire into the treatment plan to
determine whether inpatient hospitalization is adequately ad-
dressing the respondent's needs.
Judicial orders of commitment do no more than bind a pa-
tient to the care of a hospital. Although judges sometimes order
commitment for a time period shorter than the maximum au-
thorized by statute, they have no authority to issue orders speci-
fying mandatory minimum treatment periods or particular treat-
ment modalities. Rather, the institutions retain full control over
the manner in which patients are treated. While this practice is
generally considered appropriate - essentially leaving the com-
mitment decision to the judge and the treatment decisions to
the doctors - some observers believe the judges should inquire
more actively into whether the hospital plans to treat the re-
spondent in the least restrictive setting within the hospital. 138
136. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.13 (McKinney 1978). Treatment plans must in-
clude a statement of treatment goals, an indication of the treatment or therapies to be
undertaken to meet these goals, and a specific timetable for assessment of patient pro-
grams as well as for periodic mental and physical reexaminations. Patients, or their au-
thorized representatives, must be interviewed and provided with an opportunity to ac-
tively participate in the preparation and revision of treatment plans. Id. Treatment
plans are developed and maintained in the city facilities essentially as required by
statute.
137. One judge, however, stated that he always inquires into the kind of treatment
that would be provided for the patient and how much time would be needed for the
treatment to be completed.
138. The court's involvement with the institution generally ends with the commit-
ment order. Treatment facilities retain the right to refuse to accept patients into their
programs and if accepted, to select and manage their treatment. Private hospitals in
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VI. Posthearing Concerns
A. Right to Appeal
The New York statutes provide that any person who has
been denied release, or any relative or friend on the person's be-
half, may obtain a rehearing within thirty days.'39 The rehearing
process is initiated by petitioning a supreme court justice other
than the one presiding over the court that made the original or-
der.1 40 This rehearing process permits prompt correction of mis-
takes made at the initial hearing. Orders resulting from review
hearings may be appealed to the appellate division of the su-
preme court.""
Review hearings are by juries unless the patient or other
person applying for review consents in writing to trial by the
court.' 42 As a practical matter, juries are almost never sum-
moned. Reportedly, this is because juries cause delay and are
viewed by the MHIS staff as less inclined to release respondents.
Rehearings are rare and appeals are even rarer. Because the
appellate process takes so long,' 43 appeals are almost never
taken to pursue a patient's interest in release. Rather, appeals
are taken to settle points of law.'
44
B. Transfers
The transfer of patients between hospitals leads to constant
controversy in New York City. Hospitals in the city serve partic-
ular geographic areas. A hospital may refuse admission to any-
one from outside its area. If the police present a person for ad-
mission to Bellevue Hospital, for example, Bellevue personnel
may transfer the person to a hospital that is within that person's
New York City prefer to work voluntary patients, and generally do not accept patients
whose hospitalization is court-ordered. Similarly, state hospitals exercise discretion in
receiving patients commited initially in city hospitals.
139. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.35 (McKinney 1978).
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. Reportedly, an appeal to the appellate division requires about one year.
144. In addition to rehearings and appeals, involuntary patients and relatives or
friends of these patients may challenge the legality of retention by petitions for a writ'of
habeas corpus. Habeas corpus relief, however, is rarely sought.
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area.145
Transfer problems more frequently arise when a patient is
initially admitted to an acute care facility and later is found to
require treatment in a long-term care facility. Hospitals in New
York need not accept all patients presented for admission. As a
practical matter, however, Manhattan Psychiatric Center, the
primary long-term care public facility serving the First Judicial
Department, admits all involuntary transferees unless the trans-
fer papers are not properly completed.
Voluntary transferees who do not wish to be admitted to
Manhattan Psychiatric Center will not be accepted there, how-
ever. Typically, in this situation, Center personnel telephone the
sending institution and inquire whether it wishes the patient re-
turned. Frequently, these patients are discharged. Some pa-
tients, aware of this practice, convert to voluntary status prior to
transfer intending to refuse admission to Manhattan Psychiatric
Center. Of course, many such patients are returned to the send-
ing facility, where two-physician certification proceedings may
be instituted to convert the patient's status to involuntary. Staff
at Metropolitan Hospital, in an effort to prevent voluntary pa-
tients from refusing admission at the facility to which they are
transferred, frequently convert voluntary patients to involuntary
status prior to transfer.
The New York statutes forbid patient transfer to another
hospital by any form of involuntary admission without notice to
the MHIS.'" The MHIS receives copies of all transfer notices
and attempts to meet with all patients who are to be transferred.
Because transfer typically results in movement of the patient to
a longer-term, less desirable state hospital, MHIS attorneys fre-
quently request hearings to contest transfer. Although transfers
need not be approved by the MHIS, the notification process en-
ables the MHIS to represent patients who wish to contest trans-
fer to a more restrictive facility.
145. Bellevue physicians, however, question whether they have the authority to or-
der such transfers, since at the time of the transfer the individual has no patient status
at Bellevue.
146. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27(f) (McKinney 1978).
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C. Patients' Civil and Personal Rights
The New York statute provides that each patient must re-
ceive "care and treatment that is suited to his needs and skill-
fully, safely, and humanely administered with full respect for his
dignity and personal integrity."1 4 7 The following are additional
statutory requirements:
1. careful reexamination and evaluation of each patient not
less than once a year.
2. medical and dental evaluations and evaluations of mental
disabilities of inpatients by qualified professionals no less fre-
quently than once a year.
3. the order of a staff member operating within the scope of
a professional license for any treatment or therapy based on ap-
propriate examination.
4. consent for surgery, shock treatment, major medical treat-
ment in the nature of surgery, or the use of experimental drugs or
procedures.
5. inclusion in the patient's clinical record of all written
treatment plans and notation of examinations, individualized
treatment programs, evaluations and reexaminations, orders for
treatment, and specific therapies, signed by the personnel
involved.48
The statute also protects the personal and civil rights of pa-
tients, including the rights to vote and to conduct personal and
business affairs.
149
A patient who refuses routine treatment during a period of
hospitalization may appeal any treatment order through an ad-
ministrative appeals route but ultimately may be ordered to
submit to treatment.150 The following procedures are used when
an involuntary patient objects to treatment other than ex-
traordinary treatment:
(1) The objection and the doctor's request to treat will be
reviewed by the head of the service. The result of that review is
sent to the patient, the patient's representative, and the MHIS.
(2) The patient or his representative may appeal to the di-
147. Id. § 33.03.
148. Id.
149. Id. §§ 33.01, 29.03.
150. See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 27.8, 27.9 (1977).
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rector of the facility. The director will make a decision and in-
form MHIS and the patient of that decision.
(3) The patient can appeal again to the Regional Director of
Mental Hygiene. The regional director's decision will be final. 51
In the case of extraordinary treatment, such as electroshock
therapy or surgery, no treatment may be forced without a court
determination that the patient is incompetent to consent. If the
psychiatric staff of a Health and Hospitals Corporation facility
question a patient's capacity to give or withhold consent, they
may contact the Office of General Counsel which, in turn, seeks
to obtain court authorization for the extraordinary treatment.
Although most observers in New York agree that patients
should not be treated during the appeals process, unless treat-
ment is necessary to preserve the safety of the patient or others,
many admit that some physicians treat patients anyway. Once
the appeals process has been exhausted and permission to treat
has been granted, many physicians believe they may treat the
patient for the duration of his stay. Legal commentators suggest,
however, that this permission to treat should expire after a rea-
sonable period of time. 15
Observers in New York City disagree regarding the extent
to which the civil and personal rights of patients are protected
in the local hospitals. Some contend that conditions are often
unsanitary, that heating in the winter is frequently inadequate,
that basic medical care often is not provided, and that the per-
sonal safety of patients is not well protected. Some charge that
seclusion and restraints are improperly used as patient manage-
ment devices. Much of the blame for this inadequate treatment
is placed on the ward nurses, who tend to be underpaid and too
few in number. Some blame the psychiatric staff, who allegedly
prefer not to become involved in questions concerning condi-
tions of care.'53
151. N.Y. ADMiN. CODE tit. 14, § 27.8 (1977).
152. See, e.g., Zlotnick, First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis
and the Right of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 375, 435 n.
237 (1981).
153. The authors have little firsthand knowledge of conditions in the local hospitals
and, therefore, are unable to offer an assessment.
[Vol. 5:259
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss2/2
CIVIL COMMITMENT
D. Discharge and Conditional Release
The statute permits the hospital to discharge or condition-
ally release an involuntary patient if he or she "does not require
active in-patient care and treatment."'1 54 The patient may be
conditionally released, rather than discharged, if his clinical
needs warrant this more restrictive placement. 15 5 Following a
conditional release, if the director determines that the patient
needs inpatient treatment and care and that the release is no
longer appropriate, the director may at any time terminate the
release and order the patient to return to the facility."'
The conditional release provisions provide the hospital an
opportunity to release a suitable patient to a less restrictive
placement while retaining the authority to supervise the patient
and to bring the patient back into the hospital if the community
placement is ineffective or if the patient fails to participate in
the treatment program. The conditional release status is not
used at acute care hospitals in New York City, such as Bellevue
Hospital, and is rarely used at long-term care facilities, such as
Manhattan Psychiatric Center. The primary reason is, once
again, lack of available resources. Hospital staff contend that
there are insufficient alternative facilites or programs and insuf-
ficient personnel to follow-up with released patients to monitor
their progress. Thus, the hospital must either simply discharge
or retain the patient. Another reason is that, because hospitals
have no mechanism to control potentially dangerous patients on
release status, they fear third-party liability.
Since the conditional release provisions were added to the
Mental Health Act in 1975, only about thirty patients at Man-
hattan Psychiatric Center have been placed on that status. Be-
cause of the resource limitations discussed above, the hospital
reportedly has not followed statutorily required monitoring
procedures. 67
According to one MHIS attorney, at any given time at least
six or seven patients ready for discharge or release are held at
Manhattan Psychiatric Center because they have no place to go.
154. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(a) (McKinney 1978).
155. Id. § 29.15(b). The release must be in accordance with a written services plan.
156. Id. § 29.15(e).
157. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(f) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
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Some of these patients wait as long as six months to a year for
alternative placement. This situation resulted in the filing of Jo-
anne S. v. Carey discussed earlier. 58
VII. Conclusion
Civil commitment laws provide merely the skeleton of civil
commitment systems. The vital functions are better represented
by the practices, customs, and mores of the people who are re-
sponsible for implementing these laws in the community. Civil
commitment reform that fails to take into account the entire
system is of limited value.
This Article has focused on the everyday workings of the
civil commitment system in New York City. It has examined in
some detail the means employed in the City to implement the
state's commitment laws and has presented a practical analysis
of what works well and what does not. By focusing on these suc-
cesses and failures, policy makers in New York have an excellent
opportunity to effect meaningful reform in their city's civil com-
mitment system.
APPENDIX*
STUDY METHODS
The study upon which this article is based is one of six
studies of involuntary civil commitment systems undertaken in
various parts of the country by the Institute on Mental Disabil-
ity and the Law. This Appendix describes the general study
methods that the research staff employed to acquire the infor-
mation in New York City as well as the other five study sites.
A. Literature Review
Beginning in January, 1981, the staff of the Involuntary
Civil Commitment Project reviewed professional literature on
the topic of mental health law, with emphasis on allegedly men-
158. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
* This description of the study methods used in this study appeared in substantially
the same form as part of Keilitz, Fitch & McGraw, A Study of Involuntary Civil Com-
mitment in Los Angeles County, 14 Sw. UL. REV. 238, 308 (1984) and is used here by
permission.
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tally ill adults. The initial period of review lasted approximately
two months, although literature was reviewed continually
throughout the project period. Source materials were collected
from books and journals in the disciplines of law, psychiatry,
psychology, social work, sociology, and public policy administra-
tion. University professors and mental health professionals were
informed about the project and asked to provide copies of un-
published papers or other hard-to-find articles that would be of
value to the project.
Prior to the meeting of the project's national advisory board
in April, 1981, staff members prepared an "issues paper" sum-
marizing the relevant literature and defining the important con-
temporary issues of civil commitment with which this project
was to be concerned (the substantive portions of this paper have
been previously published.)** At the meeting, members of the
board helped the staff decide what research questions should be
explored during field research and gave advice on field research
methods.
B. Statutory Review
A scheme was devised for analyzing statutes governing civil
commitment. The scheme was constructed by identifying all the
important questions that might be addressed in a commitment
statute and then ordering them roughly as they might become
relevant in a typical case.
A complete statutory analysis was performed for approxi-
mately twenty states, as well as for the model statute prepared
by the Mental Health Law Project (published in the July-Au-
gust 1977 issue of the Mental Disability Law Reporter). The
twenty states were those in which the project had received fund-
ing, or states that had been brought to the staff's attention as
having statutes that were particularly interesting, innovative, or
modern.
After an individual review of all the statutes, a comparative
analysis was made. Using the analytical scheme that had been
developed, staff compiled all the variations of statutory provi-
** See Zimmerman & Fitch, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Discerning Eye of
the Law, 5 ST. CT. J. 5 (1981).
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sions relating to each of the analytical categories. This compila-
tion of statutory variations formed the basis for the major prod-
uct of the first phase of the project. Based upon this analysis,
staff determined where and how state statutes and procedures
differed with regard to civil commitment. These points of differ-
ence became the focus for field data collection.
In addition to reviewing statutes, the staff reviewed impor-
tant case law. The Mental Disability Law Reporter, law review
articles, and statute annotations were the major sources for
identifying important cases. When the case law significantly
added to or changed the range of variation that had been identi-
fied through the statutory analysis, this information was incor-
porated in the comparative analysis. Particularly thorough anal-
yses of case law were conducted for six states: California, Illinois,
Ohio, New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin.
The project staff also contacted court administrators across
the country to obtain any type of administrative regulation that
might be of help. Several copies of regulations were received. For
all states whose statutes were analyzed, published court rules
were also examined. Information gleaned from administrative
regulations and court rules was sparse, but it also was included
in the statutory analysis when appropriate.
C. Preliminary Site Visit
A preliminary visit was made to five of thesix project sites.
Staff members met with judges, court personnel, attorneys, and
mental health professionals. The preliminary visit served several
purposes. First, the participants in the civil commitment sys-
tems gave staff members their perceptions of how the systems
worked. Cooperation was pledged for the research project. Staff
of the courts and the mental health agencies invited the research
team to include them in the data collection effort and generously
offered their help.
The individuals with whom we met during the preliminary
site visit identified the agencies and institutions in New York
City that were involved with the mentally ill and civil commit-
ment. Key people within these organizations were named, and
others who were unrelated to major institutions, but who were
deemed important or knowledgeable in a particular area, were
identified.
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D. Site Visits
Intensive data-collection trips to each of the six funded sites
followed the completion of the comparative statutory analysis.
The authors worked in New York City in late 1981 and mid-
1983.
During the two weeks prior to the site visits, intensive prep-
arations were made. Important people at the site, who had been
identified during the preliminary site visit, were contacted by
telephone and appointments were made for visits the next week.
The staff thoroughly reviewed the New York statutes and case
law and identified questions of particular theoretical or practical
concern for the New York City system.
Three major activities were undertaken during site visits:
interviews, observations, and staff discussions. Most participants
were interviewed individually, although some were interviewed
in groups. With few exceptions, all interviews were conducted by
two of the authors. While one attended carefully to substance
and led the interview, the other recorded all the answers. In this
manner, one person could attend carefully to what was being
said and be sure to investigate thoroughly all important ques-
tions, and the other could be sure that everything that was said
was carefully recorded. The site visit began with interviews with
judges and observations of hearings. Then attorneys, public de-
fenders, deputy district attorneys, and private attorneys were in-
terviewed. Later interviews tended to focus more on the mental
health community: hospital administrators, mental health pro-
fessionals, and patient advocates.
Court hearings conducted during the time of the visit were
observed. For each site, an observation guide was prepared and
studied in advance of the hearings. The project team took notes
in rough form during the hearings, then rewrote the notes during
the week following the site visit.
The third major activity - discussion and analy-
sis - took place at the end of each day when the staff met to
compare notes and impressions about the system. Key concerns
were (1) which answers from various sources agreed with each
other; (2) which answers from those sources disagreed; and (3)
which answers were still missing. On the basis of these discus-
sions, interview assignments for the next day were planned.
When staff members were confident of the answers they had re-
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ceived, no further questions were asked on certain topics. When
they were uncertain, additional attention was given to these
questions in the next interviews.
The people with whom interviews were conducted were not
a statistically representative sample in any sense. They were
purposively chosen because they were identified as some of the
most well-informed and influential people in New York City
with regard to civil commitment. This was consistent with the
project goal; that is, to gain insight into how the system works
and how it might be made better by the actions of the court and
its allied agencies, from the perspectives of people with ex-
traordinary and authoritative abilities to understand and com-
ment on it.
Of course, the purposive sampling of interviewees within a
perspective favoring court action (as opposed to the perspective
of a public defender, civil libertarian, or involuntary commit-
ment "abolitionist," for example) may have left some perspec-
tives under-represented. Although we did interview ex-patients
and patient advocates, we did not speak with patients involunta-
rily hospitalized at the time of our study. We acknowledge that
the perspective of the involuntarily hospitalized persons may be
one quite different from that of ex-patients and advocates to
whom we spoke at the various sites, and one potentially valuable
for improvement of the system (even from our perspective of
court action). The close observation of several cases through the
various stages of the commitment process, enriched by the ac-
counts of the patients themselves, is a particularly attractive in-
quiry which we were unable to reach. Such omissions do not
make the present work less valid, but only incomplete - an un-
fortunate flaw of most social research.
E. The Form of the Data
The ultimate goal of the project was to generate information
by which the civil commitment process could be made to func-
tion as well as possible. The purpose of the data collection was
to obtain practitioners' opinions, advice, and suggestions about
the civil commitment process, particularly as it operates in their
own localities. Accordingly, it was appropriate that the research
be qualitative, not quantitative. We sought information about
what works best and why.
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The questions in the data collection guide were open-ended.
Multiple-choice questions were avoided so that interviewees
would be free to formulate their own opinions rather than have
their thoughts slotted into predetermined categories by the
researchers.
The data collection guide consisted of a complete set of all
the questions that were investigated: it covered many topics.
The complete data collection flowed in a more-or-less chronolog-
ical order, as events occurred during a typical commitment pro-
cess. The questions unavoidably overlapped to some degree, but
repetition was minimized as much as possible.
Because of the length of the data collection guide, every
question was not asked at every interview. A subset of questions
was presented in each interview to optimize the match of peo-
ples' areas of knowledge with the questions asked. All interview-
ees were invited, however, to discuss any aspect of the commit-
ment process with which they were familiar or about which they
had particular opinions or suggestions. Interviewers were able to
(and frequently did) stray from the planned path of questions if
it seemed useful and appropriate.
The questionnaire was considered only a data collection
guide, not a dictum. Precise language in the questions was not
considered important, and neither was the order in which the
questions were covered. The guide was simply a reminder of im-
portant issues and ideas that needed to be discussed. More con-
cern was given to understanding the answers than to writing
them down thoroughly or verbatim.
F. Analysis, Report and Review
A qualitative content analysis was performed on the data.
Interview and observation notes first were reviewed and cross-
referenced. Note was made of topics of significance, points of
consistent agreement, and points of disagreement.
The statutory analysis scheme was used as a general guide
for the analysis of the particular site's civil commitment system.
For each topic of concern, the analysis covered the statutory
provisions, the actual practice at the site, and commentary
about statute and practice.
Three major critieria, consistent with the project's perspec-
tive, were used to evaluate the civil commitment system de-
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scribed in this Article: legal protections, provision for treatment,
and social benefits. The judgments of how to apply these criteria
to elements of law and practice fell to the project team, based
upon their knowledge of the literature, their observations, their
discussions with practitioners, and (as our sociologist colleagues
are quick to point out) their socio-historic biographies. The
reader is free, of course, to disagree with this analysis and may
choose to view the system's strengths and weaknesses differ-
ently. A system characteristic may be simultaneously a strength
and a weakness, when viewed from different perspectives.
First, concern was given to the extent to which legal protec-
tions are provided to everyone in the system. The primary con-
sideration was, of course, with the involuntarily detained pa-
tient. But statutes and procedures also can provide important
legal protections to other people who become involved, such as
doctors, attorneys, and members of the patient's family. Gener-
ally, this is an important criterion for those who are most con-
cerned about the patient's liberty; but legal protections encom-
pass more than simply protecting a person from unnecessary
hospitalization (for example, protecting the right to treatment).
The analysis also considered how well a system makes pro-
visions for treatment. Admittedly, we are assuming that a valid
need for treatment does exist for some people some of the
time - an assumption consistent with the public values re-
flected in current commitment laws throughout the country.
Provisions for treatment should be understood to encompass
more than involuntary hospitalization; however, a system might
get high marks in this regard by its creative consideration of less
restrictive treatment alternatives and the opportunities for vol-
untary treatment that it provides.
Finally, social benefits, including fiscal factors, were consid-
ered. Society in general has a legitimate concern with keeping
each of its members safe from harm and contributing produc-
tively to the community. Society is also served by minimizing
the costs inherent in a civil commitment system, eliminating any
unnecessary delays in legal and medical decisionmaking, and
avoiding undue burdens on already strained state resources.
These factors are considered equally important in this Arti-
cle, and it is recognized that some system characteristics that
score high in one area necessarily will score low in another. It
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should be noted, too, that we make no claim that this evaluative
scheme is either unique or original. Professional literature
reveals that these criteria are used commonly in considering
commitment systems, as well as by judges in deciding individual
commitment cases. The courts are accustomed to the balancing
interests (that are sometimes conflicting) as an approach to ana-
lyzing legal problems.
To complete the analysis, possible ways to change and im-
prove the system were considered. These were written into vari-
ous recommendations throughout this Article. The recommenda-
tions should not be taken as research conclusions or empirically
proven statements of fact. Rather, they are our suggestions,
based upon our studies and points of view. The recommenda-
tions derive from a variety of sources: suggestions made by peo-
ple at the sites, conclusions from the professional literature, and
ideas generated by the authors during the project work. It is im-
possible to sort out the influence of these various sources in any
recommendation, or to report accurately how extensively any
person or group would agree with any single recommendation.
The purpose of presenting recommendations is to highlight
certain problems and alert people in New York City to possible
solutions. Although it is easy for us to identify a problem, we do
not pretend to hold "The Answer." A more realistic expectation
is to present "an answer," however modest and tentative, as a
stimulus and starting point for thoughtful consideration by
those who know the system in New York City better and are in a
position to make appropriate changes.
Site reports were reviewed first by project staff and then
sent out as "review drafts." The report upon which this Article
is based was sent for review by all individuals who had partici-
pated in the data collection effort. Everyone receiving a review
draft was invited to make suggestions for change and was urged
to correct any statements that were factually incorrect.
These reviews were then taken into account in preparing
the final report from which this Article was adapted. It should
not be inferred, however, that this Article or its recommenda-
tions have been or will be adopted officially by any individual,
group, or organization in New York City, or that the reviewers
and participants had a unanimous concurrence of opinion on all
issues raised in this Article.
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